PART 7

Korean Operations

1950-1953

The outbreak of war in Korea caught U.S. military

services in the midst of a transition. The establishment

of the Department of Defense in 1947 and its reorgani-

zation in 1949 required readjustments within the ser-

vices to which none had become completely acclimat-

ed. Successive decreases in the military budget and

the prospect of more to come had reduced the size of

all services, and a reorganization of operating forces to

keep within prescribed limits was in process. New

weapons and equipment had not been completely

integrated, and tactical doctrine and new operating

techniques for their most effective employment were

still being developed. This was particularly apparent in

Naval Aviation, where the introduction of jet aircraft

had created a composite force in which like units

were equipped with either jet or propeller-driven air-

craft having wide differences in performance charac-

teristics, maintenance and support requirements, and

tactical application.

Combat requirements in Korea were quite different

from those of the island-hopping campaign of World

War II. Only the landings at Inchon, two and a half

months after the shooting began, followed the familiar

pattern. The UN's intention to confine the battle area

to the peninsula resulted in a limitation of air opera-

tions in support of troops. This was a normal enough

mission for carrier air, but the need to sustain it for

extended periods over an extremely large landmass

made quite a difference. Carrier forces also flew deep

support missions; attacked enemy supply lines;

roamed over enemy territory looking for targets of

opportunity; bombed enemy bridges; interdicted high-

ways and railroads; attacked refineries, railroad yards

and hydroelectric plants; and escorted land-based

bombers on special missions. All were carried out

effectively, but were new experiences for units trained

to interdict enemy sea-lines of communication and

ward off attack by enemy naval forces.

The see-saw action on the ground as the battle line

shifted and as action flared up and quieted again

required great flexibility of force and demanded the

ability to carry out a variety of missions, but after the

first six months of the war, the overall air campaign

developed into a monotonous, although serious, rou-

tine. It was a battle described by Commander Task

Force 77 in January 1952 as "a day-to-day routine

where stamina replaces glamour and persistence is pit-

ted against oriental perseverance."

Compared to World War II, Korea was a small war.

At no time were more than four large carriers in action

at the same time. Yet in the three years of war, Navy

and Marine aircraft flew 276,000 combat sorties,

dropped 177,000 tons of bombs and expended

272,000 rockets. This was within 7,000 sorties of their

World War II totals in all theaters and bettered the

bomb tonnage by 74,000 tons, and the number of

rockets by 60,000. In terms of national air effort, the

action sorties flown by Navy and Marine Corps aircraft

rose from less than 10 percent in World War II to bet-

ter than 30 percent in Korea.

There was another and perhaps greater difference

between the two wars. Support of forces in Korea

required major attention from the planners and of

units assigned to logistic supply, but action in Korea

was only a part of the total activity of the period.

Outside the combat area fleet forces continued their

training operations on the same scale as before, and

fleet units were continuously maintained on peaceful

missions in the eastern Atlantic and in the

Mediterranean. Research and development, although

accelerated, did not shift to emphasize projects having

direct application to the war effort but continued on

longer range programs directed toward progressively

modernizing fleet forces and their equipment with

more effective weapons. New facilities for test and

evaluation were opened. Advances in guided missiles

reached new highs indicating their early operational

status, and ships to employ them were being readied.

Firings of research missiles like Loon, Lark and Viking

from shore installations and from ships provided both

useful data and experience. Terrier, Talos, Sparrow,

Sidewinder, and Regulus passed successive stages of

development. Research in high-speed flight, assisted

by flights of specially designed aircraft, provided data

leading to new advances in aircraft performance. The

carrier modernization program continued and was

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